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1959] RECENT DECISIONS 769 
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-EFFECT ON ORAL EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBU-
TORSHIP AGREEMENT FOR INDEFINITE DURATION-In 1935 plaintiff brewery 
made an oral agreement of no definite duration by which defendant and his 
father, as partners, were given the exclusive right to distribute its beer. 
Defendant, changing from one partnership to another, complied with 
various wishes of the plaintiff such as furnishing warehousing, purchasing 
uniform amounts of beer throughout the year although seasonal demands 
varied, dissolving the second partnership in 1950, discontinuing distribu-
tion of a rival beer in 1954, and hiring a sales promotion man in June 1954; 
the latter three actions taken on plaintiff's assurance that he would con-
tinue defendant's distributorship. In July 1954 plaintiff, without cause or 
notice, cancelled defendant's franchise. Plaintiff then brought an action 
against defendant for the balance due on an open account for beer sold, and 
defendant, admitting this, counterclaimed for breach of contract. On appeal 
from a verdict and judgment for defendant on the counterclaim, held, 
reversed.1 Plaintiff was entitled to an instruction that if the jury found the 
parties impliedly agreed that the contract would continue for a reasonable 
1 The judgment entered was the amount of the verdict less the admitted indebtedness 
sued on. 
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time, then it must determine what period would constitute a reasonable 
time; if such time exceeded one year, the agreement would not be binding 
upon the plaintiff since it was not in writing. San Francisco Brewing Corp. 
v. Bowman, (Cal. App. 1958) 329 P. (2d) 349. 
The statute of frauds expressly invalidates contracts which by their 
terms2 are "not to be performed within a year from the making thereof."3 
Courts have usually construed agreements having no definite duration to be 
terminable at will and therefore outside the statute, for they may be fully 
performed within a year.4 There is, however, a class of oral contracts which, 
although setting no time for performance, are not held to be terminable 
at will.5 The exclusive distributorship in the principal case is illustrative 
of this type contract. Since the distributor, in addition to his services in 
selling the manufacturer's product, often incurs additional expenses in 
market development and other reliance on the agreement, 6 the courts usu-
ally imply that the parties intended the contract to last for a reasonable 
time and that reasonable notice must be given before termination. The 
issue squarely presented in the principal case is whether the judicial de-
termination that the reasonable duration of an exclusive distributorship 
contract is more than twelve months should bring the agreement within 
the statute of frauds as an agreement not to be performed within one year. 
The few cases considering this question have suggested an affirmative an-
swer. In a recent Texas case7 involving the breach of an exclusive distribu-
torship by the manufacturer, the court said that the contract should not be 
outside the statute simply because the duration was implied and pointed out 
that if the law is justified in implying any length of performance, it is justi-
fied in defining that period in regular units of time. In two other recent 
cases with similar facts,8 it was stated that where a_ reasonable time ex-
ceeded one year, the agreement was within the statute, but the courts con-
. 2 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, 2d ed., §495 (1936); 2 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §444 (1950); 1 
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT §198, comment b (1932); GRISMORE, CoNTRAcrs §266 (1947). 
8 Cal. Civ. Code Ann. (Deering, 1949) §1624. 
4 See generally 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §446 (1950); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., 
§495 (1936); 1 REED, THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS §200 (1884); 2 AGENCY RESTATEMENT §442, 
comment a (1933); note, 55 MICH. L. REv. 1166 (1957); 135 A.L.R. 688 (1941). 
5 Hunt Foods v. Phillips, (9th Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 23; Allied :Equipment Co. v. 
Weber :Engineered Products, (4th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 879; J. C. Millett Co. v. Park 
&: Tilford Distillers Corp., (D.C. Cal. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 484; Erskine v. Chevrolet Motor 
Co., 185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706 (1923); 32 A.L.R. 196 at 232 (1924); 2 AGENCY R:fsTATEMENT 
§442, comment c (1933); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1027A, p. 2852 (1936); note, 
55 MICH. L. REV. 1166 at 1167 (1957). 
6 Hunt Foods v. Phillips, note 5 supra; J. C. Millett Co. v. Park &: Tilford Distillers 
Corp., note 5 supra; Erskine v. Chevrolet Motor Co., note 5 supra; 2 AGENCY RESTATEMENT 
§442, comments a and c (1933); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1027A, p. 2852 (1936). 
7 Hall v. Hall, (Tex. 1957) 308 S.W. (2d) 12. 
s Hunt Foods v. Phillips, note 5 supra; Fibreboard Products, Inc. v. Townsend, 
(9th Cir. 1953) 202 F •. (2d) 180. 
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eluded that the defendant was estopped to raise the issue because of the 
distributor's reliance. Finally, in a similar federal case9 the court found a 
reasonable time to be one year with the result that the contract was outside 
the statute of frauds. The California court followed the apparent logic sug-
gested in the above decisions that a contract with an implied duration of 
more than one year would appear to be a contract not to be performed 
within one year. However, the logic exists more in form than in substance. 
Generally, in exclusive distributorship agreements, it is the manufacturer 
who refuses to set a definite duration because he wants to be able to end 
the contract when he wishes. His superior economic position often gives 
him the power to do this.10 The purpose of implying that an agreement 
such as that in the principal case must last a reasonable time is to protect 
the distributor from loss due to reliance expense induced by the manufac-
turer. To hold that the implication of a reasonable time could bring the 
contract within the statute is to use a device, originated for the distribu-
tor's protection, to defeat his claim. The desired result could be reached by 
either of two approaches. The court could refuse to allow the jury to imply 
a reasonable duration and simply hold the contract terminable at will by 
either party but only upon the giving of reasonable notice, which would 
not likely exceed one year. This would eliminate the statute of frauds 
dilemma and also afford protection to the distributor without raising the 
problem of holding the manufacturer liable for reliance or expectation 
damages based on a contract for longer than one year.11 The alternative 
solution would be for the court to allow the implication of a reasonable 
duration but avoid the self-defeating application of the statute, where the 
duration is found to be longer than one year, through invocation of an 
estoppel based on the distributor's reliance on the agreement and conse-
quent change of position through the incurring of expenses.12 The fre-
quency with which contracts of this type are used would seem to warrant 
some definitive manner of protection for the discharged distributor. 
Robert Segar 
9 J. C. Millett Co. v. Park &: Tilford Distillers Corp., note 5 supra. 
10 J. C. Millett Co. v. Park &: Tilford Distillers Corp., note 5 supra; 4 WILLISTON, 
CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1027A, p. 2853 (1936); comment, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1010 at 1012 (1950). 
The problem has been serious enough in the automobile industry to result in congres-
sional legislation. See Brown and Conwill, "Automobile Manufacturer-Dealer Legisla-
tion," 57 CoL. L. REv. 219 (1957); comment, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1239 (1957). See also com-
ment, 31 CoL. L. REv. 830 (1931). 
11 Even if liability were established it would seem that presumed knowledge of the 
one-year clause of the statute of frauds would limit foreseeability of reliance damages, 
and for ·the same reason it can be questioned whether expectation damages should not be 
limited by the same period. 
12 See Fibreboard Products, Inc. v. Townsend, note 8 supra. The use of estoppel to 
protect defendant here was expressly left open by the court. Principal case at 356. 
